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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge: 
 
In June 1990, La Salle University retired Professor Robert 
J. Courtney, over his objection, because he had reached the 
age of seventy. A year later, Professor Charles A. Halpin 
was retired for the same reason. Both professors had long 
been aware that La Salle's policy mandated their retirement 
at age seventy, but neither filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") until 
November 1991. The question on this appeal is whether 
their charges under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634, ("ADEA") were timely filed. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
La Salle has long maintained a mandatory retirement 
policy. In 1963, the Faculty Handbook stated that 
employment at the University would continue beyond age 
sixty-five only upon approval by the Board of Managers. 
Four years later, the College Council voted to adopt a 
mandatory retirement age of sixty-five. In 1982, the 
mandatory retirement policy was amended to require 
retirement at the end of the year in which the professor 
reached the age of seventy. 
 
Professors Courtney and Halpin began teaching at La 
Salle in 1946, and received academic tenure ten years later. 
In the mid-1960s both received letters announcing their 
"appointment for life" to the rank of "professor." 
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In 1988, both Courtney and Halpin inquired about taking 
sabbaticals and were told that La Salle would not allow it 
because they were nearing mandatory retirement. The 
professors responded that the "appointment for life" 
represented a contract of lifetime employment, and that 
they did not have to retire. On May 20, 1988, La Salle sent 
identical letters to each professor, stating that"the 
University is not contractually obligated to employ you 
beyond the end of the fiscal year in which you reach the 
age of seventy." La Salle stated its position that the 
professors were employed under contracts of one year only: 
 
       Your 1987-1988 contract, dated May 18 and executed 
       May 27, 1987, as well as your 1988-1989 contract . . . 
       clearly states: "This appointment, if accepted by you, 
       constitutes the entire agreement between you and La 
       Salle University concerning the term of your 
       appointment, rank and salary. . . . 
 
        Thus, your present faculty contract is a fully 
       integrated agreement and its term is only for the 1988- 
       1989 academic year. It does not contain any of the 
       language used in the contracts of the early 60's. 
 
Two years later, the professors filed suit in state court, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that they had contracts of 
lifetime employment. No charge of age discrimination was 
filed with the EEOC at that time. The trial court found that 
the professors did indeed have contracts of lifetime 
employment (based on the 1960's "appointment for life" 
language), but the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, 
holding that the professors had entered into integrated 
contracts for a term of one year only. Halpin v. La Salle 
Univ., 639 A.2d 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 668 A.2d 1133 
(Pa. 1994) (table). 
 
Courtney turned seventy during the 1989-1990 school 
year. In February 1990, La Salle formally notified him that, 
consistent with University policy, he would be required to 
retire at the end of the school year. Courtney was offered a 
part-time teaching position with reduced salary and 
benefits for the fall of 1990, which he accepted. 
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Halpin turned seventy in January 1991. On February 1, 
1991, La Salle notified him that school policy required him 
to retire at the end of the 1990-1991 school year, and 
offered him a part-time teaching position for the following 
academic year, which he too accepted. 
 
On November 29, 1991, Halpin and Courtney filed 
charges of discrimination under the ADEA with the EEOC. 
After the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters, they brought 
two separate actions in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The complaints 
alleged violations of the ADEA, in Count I based on the 
mandatory retirement policy and the part-time employment 
policy, and in Count II based on an alleged pattern and 
practice of discrimination against employees over seventy.1 
 
La Salle moved for summary judgment, contending that 
as a matter of law it falls within the ADEA exemption for 
tenured professors, 29 U.S.C. S 631(d) (1993) (repealed by 
P.L. 99-592, S 6(b)). The district court denied La Salle's 
motion for summary judgment on this point, concluding 
that La Salle was bound by the state appellate court's 
holding that the professors' contracts were for a term of one 
year only, and therefore did not meet the terms of the 
exemption, which requires a contract or similar 
arrangement for unlimited tenure. 
 
La Salle also moved for summary judgment in both cases 
based on 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2), which requires that a 
charge of unlawful discrimination under the ADEA befiled 
"within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice 
occurred . . . ." The district court granted summary 
judgment on Courtney's claims, finding that the November 
1991 charge was brought more than 300 days after his 
claims accrued and that no equitable exception to the 
limitations period applied. As to Halpin's claims, the district 
court granted the motion on the mandatory retirement 
claim, finding it untimely, but denied it on Halpin's claim of 
discrimination based on the part-time employment policy. 
The district court certified the order in Halpin's case for 
interlocutory appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of Count II. 
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 We have jurisdiction of Courtney's appeal under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, and of Halpin's appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). Our review of the district court's decision is de 
novo. Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 
(3d Cir. 1995).2 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. APPLICATION OF THE ADEA TENURE EXEMPTION 
 
The ADEA generally prohibits employers from 
"discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(1). There is no 
question that both Halpin and Courtney were discharged or 
otherwise discriminated against because of their age: both 
were required to retire solely because they were seventy 
years old. La Salle contends, however, that the mandatory 
retirements were legal because of a then-existing exemption 
under the ADEA which provided: 
 
       Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit 
       compulsory retirement of any employee who has 
       attained 70 years of age, and who is serving under a 
       contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement 
       providing for unlimited tenure) at an institution of 
       higher learning. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 631(d) (1993) (repealed by P.L. 99-592, S 6(b)). 
Because the ADEA does not define "contract of unlimited 
tenure," we look to interpretation of the exemption in the 
EEOC's regulations, 29 C.F.R. S 1625.11. Levine v. Fairleigh 
Dickinson Univ., 646 F.2d 825, 831 (3d Cir. 1981) (deferring 
to EEOC interpretation of tenured faculty exemption); 
Crozier v. Howard, 11 F.3d 967, 971 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(same). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we remand his mandatory retirement claim, we leave the 
disposition of his part-time employment claim to the district court 
without expressing a view on the merits of the court's earlier ruling on 
that issue. As for Courtney's claim, it is in any event barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
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"Unlimited tenure," according to the EEOC, means 
 
       an arrangement under which certain appointments in 
       an institution of higher education are continued until 
       retirement for age o[r] physical disability, subject to 
       dismissal for adequate cause or under extraordinary 
       circumstances on account of financial exigency or 
       change of institutional program. Adopting that 
       definition, it is evident that the word "unlimited" refers 
       to the duration of tenure. Therefore, a contract (or other 
       similar arrangement) which is limited to a specific term 
       (for example, one year or 10 years) will not meet the 
       requirements of the exemption. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1625.11(e)(1) (emphasis added). The 
requirement that the contract (or similar arrangement) be 
for "unlimited" tenure is essential to the exemption, even if 
traditional protections of tenure3 are extended during the 
limited term of appointment: 
 
       Employees who are not assured of a continuing 
       appointment either by contract of unlimited tenure or 
       other similar arrangement (such as a state statute) 
       would not, of course, be exempted from the 
       prohibitions against compulsory retirement, even if 
       they perform functions identical to those performed by 
       employees with appropriate tenure. 
 
Id. S 1625.11(f) (emphasis added). The EEOC also instructs 
that the elements of unlimited tenure must be "clearly and 
unmistakably met," and that "this exemption must be 
narrowly construed." Id. S 1625.11(b). 
 
The district court found that Professor Halpin was 
afforded the protections of tenure under the 1940 AAUP 
Statement. It further held, however, that La Salle could not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The regulation separately defines what "tenure" means by reference to 
the 1940 American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") 
"Statement of Principles" on academic tenure. The 1940 AAUP Statement 
requires that any appointment be in writing, mandates academic 
freedom, defines a procedure governing termination for cause, and 
requires that any financial exigency (justifying termination) be bona 
fide. 
Id. S 1625.11(e)(2). The absence of any of these factors does not preclude 
a finding of "tenure" under the ADEA exemption. Id. S 1625.11(e)(3). 
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establish compliance with the exemption because the 
decision of the state appellate court established that the 
term of Halpin's contracts was for one year only. We agree. 
Because Halpin was "not assured of a continuing 
appointment either by contract of unlimited tenure or other 
similar arrangement (such as a state statute)," 29 C.F.R. 
S 1625.11(f), the exemption does not apply. 
 
We must give the state court's judgment the same effect 
it would have in the Pennsylvania state courts. Mosley v. 
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1996). "Collateral estoppel, 
sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, operates to 
prevent a question of law or an issue of fact which has once 
been litigated and adjudicated finally in a court of 
competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in a 
subsequent suit." Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 553 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 
       Under Pennsylvania law, . . . a prior determination of 
       a legal issue is conclusive in a subsequent action 
       between the parties on the same or a different claim 
       when (1) the issue was actually litigated; (2) the issue 
       was determined by a valid and final judgment; and (3) 
       the determination was essential to the judgment. 
 
O'Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The duration of Halpin's contract was the sole issue 
before the state court: "Here, none of the parties contend 
that employment was at will. There is dispute, however, 
regarding the length of the term for which employment was 
contracted." Halpin v. La Salle Univ., 639 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994). The state court accepted La Salle's 
argument that "employment as a member of the faculty was 
year by year," id. at 38, and held that while Halpin was 
guaranteed the "rank" of professor for the rest of his life, 
"the duration of employment in each contract was for a 
period of one academic year." Id. at 40. 
 
La Salle contends that it does not seek to re-litigate 
issues decided in the state court because it seeks only to 
establish the meaning of the term "academic tenure," which 
it says was not an issue in the state court litigation. To this 
end, La Salle argues that Halpin was guaranteed continued 
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employment based on the University's Faculty Handbook. 
The Handbook states: 
 
       La Salle University subscribes to the principle of 
       academic tenure, that is, title to continued 
       employment. . . . The full-time teacher under contract 
       with tenure may competently expect to hold his/her 
       position until he/she is retired for age or permanent 
       disability or separated for adequate cause under due 
       process or because of financial exigencies of the 
       institution. 
 
But we need not decide whether the Handbook gave Halpin 
a contract of unlimited duration (subject, of course, to 
mandatory retirement or dismissal for cause or forfinancial 
exigency): the state court has decided the issue. The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that because the 
contracts were "clear and unequivocal" on the subject of 
duration, no extrinsic evidence would be permitted to vary 
their meaning. Halpin, 639 A.2d at 39-40. And since 29 
U.S.C. S 631(d) requires a contract or similar legal 
obligation (e.g., a statute, 29 C.F.R. S 1625.11(f)) to 
guarantee continued employment, it is no defense that 
Halpin, as La Salle now asserts, had some sort of 
amorphous "expectation" that his contract would be 
renewed. 
 
La Salle appears to argue that the state court could have 
decided the case in its favor without reaching the issue of 
the duration of the contracts, by holding only that Halpin 
had no right to continued employment past age seventy. 
While the state court could have construed the evidence of 
the parties' intent, including the Faculty Handbook, as 
guaranteeing continued employment up to age seventy, it 
did not decide the case on that basis. We have previously 
rejected the "notion that an issue is not essential if, under 
some hypothetical resolution of the dispute, the issue could 
have been avoided." O'Leary, 923 F.2d at 1067 (3d Cir. 
1991) (applying Pennsylvania law). The state court held that 
the only contract between Halpin and La Salle specified a 
period of employment of one academic year, and held that 
extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to prove that La Salle 
was obligated to more. Halpin, 639 A.2d at 39-40. These 
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determinations were not dicta, but were essential to the 
holding of the case and are binding here. 
 
Because at the time of Halpin's retirement, La Salle's 
contract with him was limited to a term of one year, the 
ADEA exemption did not apply. Accordingly, the district 
court was correct in rejecting La Salle's claim to the ADEA 
exemption for contracts of unlimited tenure. 
 
II. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 
A. Professor Halpin 
 
The limitations period under the ADEA generally begins 
"when the employer has established its official position and 
made that position apparent to the employee by explicit 
notice." Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co. , 935 F.2d 1407, 
1416-17 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 
U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 
449 U.S. 250 (1980). Halpin was aware long before 
February 2, 1991 (which was 300 days before his charge 
was filed) that he would be required to retire at the end of 
the 1990-1991 school year. The mandatory retirement 
policy had been in place for over twenty years; the specific 
policy he challenges was adopted in 1982. The 1988 
correspondence between Halpin and La Salle told him that 
he would have to retire in 1991; his 1990 state court 
complaint showed that he understood exactly what La Salle 
meant. Halpin's claim is therefore barred unless (1) it was 
tolled by equitable estoppel or, (2) under the continuing 
violation theory, the last date of accrual was when the 
mandatory retirement policy was applied to him. 
 
       1. Equitable estoppel 
 
Halpin's first contention is that La Salle "affirmatively 
misled" him into believing that its retirement policy was 
lawful. In Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that "where a 
defendant actively misleads the plaintiff regarding the 
reason for the plaintiff 's dismissal" the limitations period 
will be tolled "until the facts which would support the 
plaintiff 's cause of action are apparent, or should be 
apparent" to a reasonably prudent person. 
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Halpin argues that he was led to believe that LaSalle's 
retirement policy was exempt under the ADEA: that he was 
at an institution of higher learning and serving under a 
contract (or similar arrangement) of unlimited tenure, see 
supra pp. 6-8. For this reason, he claims, he did not know 
that he had an ADEA claim. Halpin asserts that it was not 
until October 1991 that he learned, from the position taken 
by LaSalle in the state court litigation, that he had a 
contract for a one-year term only. This revelation, he says, 
prompted the filing of his charge with the EEOC in 
November. 
 
Halpin has the burden of establishing the equitable 
tolling exception. Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 
648, 661 (11th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs have burden of 
establishing equitable tolling in Title VII case). But Halpin 
presented no evidence showing that he in fact believed that 
La Salle's mandatory retirement policy was lawful and 
delayed filing his charge for that reason. To the contrary, in 
his deposition Halpin testified that filing was delayed 
because he hoped the state court contract action would 
prompt a settlement. Moreover, the employment contracts, 
which Halpin now asserts show that he did not  have a 
contract of unlimited tenure (taking him out of the ADEA 
exemption), were signed by him annually for many years. 
La Salle's 1988 letter to Halpin clearly disclosed its position 
that his contract was for a one-year term only. On these 
facts, no reasonable fact-finder could find the facts to 
support equitable tolling. 
 
       2. Continuing violation 
 
The district court held that Halpin's claim based on 
LaSalle's mandatory retirement policy accrued and the 300 
day filing period began to run when La Salle informed him 
that he would be involuntarily retired under the policy. 
Halpin had notice of the mandatory retirement policy, and 
its prospective application to him, by the time hefiled the 
state court action in May 1990, well outside the 300 day 
period. Halpin contends, however, that under the 
continuing violation theory his charge was timelyfiled. The 
district court rejected this argument, holding that the 
theory did not apply in the absence of a "pattern or practice 
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of discrimination." The court reasoned that there was no 
continuing violation because "the application of the 
mandatory retirement policy . . . happened once." 
 
The district court based its ruling on Delaware State 
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), holding that "a 
plaintiff may not rely on the continuing violation theory to 
advance claims about isolated instances of discrimination 
concluded in the past, even though the effects  persist into 
the present." E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 
211, 218 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing holding in Ricks) 
(emphasis in original). In Westinghouse, we recognized that 
where the challenge is to a continuing discriminatory policy 
--in this case, the age-based mandatory retirement policy-- 
each application of that policy to an employee constitutes a 
discrete act of discrimination. Id. at 219-20; see also Webb 
v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 931 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1991) 
("Ordinarily, in the case of a continuing unlawful practice, 
every day that the practice continues is a fresh wrong for 
purposes of the statute of limitations. . . . Ricks [did not] 
abolish this principle. . . . We adopt the distinction made 
in . . . EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. , between the 
present consequence of a one-time violation and the 
continuation of the violation into the present.") (citations 
omitted); O'Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 821 
(2d Cir. 1985); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. , 45 F.3d 744, 
754 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying the continuing violation theory 
to a claim of disciminatory pattern and practice). 
 
Application of the continuing violation theory requires 
proof of the existence of a discriminatory policy and of its 
application to plaintiff; both elements are present here. The 
time for filing a charge runs from the most recent 
application of the policy to plaintiff, regardless of when he 
received notice of the policy and its prospective effect on 
him. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d at 219. Situations 
like Ricks and Chardon are distinguishable; there the 
"alleged unlawful practice occur[s]" when the discriminatory 
decision, e.g., to deny tenure, or to terminate the employee, 
is made based on an impermissible factor. 
 
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 
(1989), the Supreme Court limited the application of the 
continuing violation theory to policies that are "facially 
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discriminatory." Id. at 912 n.5. The court reasoned that 
where a policy is "facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally 
applied," its invalidity is "wholly dependent on the alleged 
illegality of [its adoption]." Id. at 911. In contrast, when the 
employer has an express policy of terminating employees 
based on their age, the policy "by definition discriminates 
each time it is applied." Id. at 912 n.5. The timeliness of a 
challenge to a mandatory retirement provision is therefore 
determined "with reference to the earlier of either the last 
day of employment, or, if applicable, the date on which the 
employer eliminates the unlawful provision." See O'Malley, 
758 F.2d at 821 (quoting EEOC v. Home Ins. Co. , 553 
F.Supp. 704, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)); accord EEOC v. 
Kentucky State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir.) 
(mandatory retirement statute "facially discriminates 
between troopers younger than fifty-five years of age and 
those older than fifty-five years of age"; thus, "a claim 
becomes ripe when the statute is applied, [i.e.,] when the 
trooper is mandatorily retired."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 
385 (1996); but cf. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 
1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that notice, rather 
than retirement, begins the 300 day limitations period to 
challenge mandatory retirement policy). 
 
La Salle concedes that its mandatory retirement policy 
discriminates among its professors on the basis of age and 
that it applied this policy to Halpin within the 300 day 
charge-filing period. But it contends that its policy was not 
subject to the continuing violation theory because it was 
"facially legal," i.e., that on its face it complied with the 
statutory exemption for tenured professors.4 
 
Lorance draws a distinction between facially neutral and 
facially discriminatory policies. It provides no support for 
the argument that a policy that discriminates on the basis 
of otherwise prohibited characteristics should be treated as 
though it were facially neutral because it appears on its 
face (though not in fact, see supra, p. 12-13) to fall within 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The La Salle policy states: "Beginning June 30, 1982, retirement from 
full-time teaching shall be mandatory for ranked, tenured faculty as of 
the last day of the fiscal year in which the faculty member reaches the 
age of seventy." 
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a statutory exemption. Indeed the court's articulation of the 
distinction is inconsistent with such a theory: 
 
       With a facially neutral system the discriminatory act 
       occurs only at the time of adoption, for each 
       application is nondiscriminatory (seniority accrues for 
       men and women on an identical basis). But a facially 
       discriminatory system (e.g., one that assigns men twice 
       the seniority that women receive for the same amount 
       of time served) by definition discriminates each time it 
       is applied. 
 
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912 n.5. Here too we have a facially 
discriminatory policy, i.e., one that on its face sorts 
employees according to age. That La Salle may have a 
defense does not make it less discriminatory. La Salle's 
argument ignores the distinction underlying Lorance, 
between policies that can be attacked only on the basis of 
the discriminatory intent that motivated their adoption and 
those whose legality turns not on the sponsor's intent but 
on the prohibited effect of their application. There is no 
issue in this case over whether La Salle adopted its policy 
with a discriminatory intent; the question is solely whether 
it violates the ADEA when it is applied.5  
 
Halpin's EEOC charge was timely because he filed within 
300 days of the date that the "alleged unlawful practice 
occurred," i.e., the date on which La Salle mandatorily 
retired him from full-time employment. 
 
B. Professor Courtney 
 
Professor Courtney's circumstances are significantly 
different from Halpin's. Like Halpin, Courtney knew of his 
impending retirement far in advance of the actual date. But 
when the policy was finally applied to him in 1991, 
triggering the charge-filing period even under the 
continuing violation theory, he did not assert a claim under 
the ADEA. Instead, he waited almost a year and a half 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. La Salle relies on O'Malley which, without analysis, rejected a 
continuing violation theory where a policy was "facially proper." 758 F.2d 
at 821. Because O'Malley was decided before Lorance and did not 
consider the issues discussed in our opinion, we do not find it 
persuasive. 
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before filing the EEOC charge, well beyond the 300 days 
permitted by 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2). 
 
Courtney argues, as does Halpin, that he was actively 
misled by La Salle's statement that he had "tenure." But as 
with Halpin, no reasonable jury could find that Courtney 
acted in reliance on La Salle's position,6  or that such 
reliance was reasonable in light of the 1988 letter, which 
explained La Salle's position with respect to the one year 
contract. 
 
The district court properly granted summary judgment 
on Courtney's claims arising from his subsequent part-time 
employment as well. The only distinction between Courtney 
and those he says are "similarly situated" is that he was 
mandatorily retired at age 70 and they were not. Having 
failed to challenge his mandatory retirement within 300 
days, he is barred from complaining of the continuing 
consequences the retirement has on his employment 
status. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We AFFIRM the order granting summary judgment 
against Courtney. We VACATE the order granting partial 
summary against Halpin based on untimely filing of his 
EEOC charge, and REMAND for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Courtney explained in his deposition why he delayed filing his charge: 
 
       Q: [W]hat prompted you to file this charge alleging age 
       discrimination in November of 1991? 
 
       A: My paycheck . . .When I started receiving the part-time pay [in 
       September 1990]. 
 
       Q: [W]hy did you wait until November of`91 to file this charge 
       when the change in your pay occurred in September of`90? 
        A: We thought that we could reach a resolution with La Salle on 
       the basis of our contention versus their contention. When that 
       didn't happen, I filed with the EEOC. 
 
Courtney Dep., 38-39. 
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BECKER, concurring. 
 
The threshold question on this appeal is whether to give 
collateral estoppel effect to the state court determination 
that Courtney and Halpin had contract rights of a duration 
limited to one year, and thus did not have the "unlimited 
tenure" necessary to trigger the tenured faculty exemption, 
29 U.S.C. S 631(d). I believe that the state court's decision 
was wrong, but I also believe that Judge Schwarzer is 
correct that we must give it collateral estoppel effect. 
 
The state court appears to have accepted the plaintiffs' 
tenure status. In fact, before engaging in its contractual 
analysis, the state court even stated, albeit offhandedly, 
that the plaintiffs held tenured positions. But the court 
pursued a different interpretation of the significance of 
tenure, concluding that tenure meant nothing more than 
that plaintiffs were guaranteed the rank of professor for 
their academic life. 
 
It is not surprising that the state court did not engage in 
the same analysis that we would have in an ADEA claim. 
Courtney and Halpin did not raise ADEA claims in state 
court, and La Salle did not argue the exemption since there 
was no ADEA claim to defend at the time. Moreover, the 
issue before us involves the application of a federal statute 
with its own set of governing regulations. 
 
My concern about the result I must reach is compounded 
by the fact that I am convinced that La Salle in fact 
qualified for the ADEA exemption on the basis of the 1956 
Faculty Handbook and the letters written by the University 
to each plaintiff which, I believe, granted plaintiffs tenure 
rights. And yet, with respect to those matters, the state 
court said: 
 
       The contracts in the instant case, when construed as 
       a whole, are clear and unambiguous. It was 
       unnecessary to refer to the language appearing in the 
       1956 Faculty Bulletin or letters by the university to 
       members of the faculty to ascertain the parties' intent. 
       The fact that parties to a contract disagree upon its 
       proper interpretation does not necessarily render the 
       writing ambiguous. 
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In view of this passage, I cannot gainsay the accuracy of 
Judge Schwarzer's observation that the state court has 
already decided what the Handbook (and inferentially the 
letters) in fact gave the professors. And I know of no 
principle permitting us to avoid giving collateral estoppel 
effect to erroneous decisions. My discomfiture about the 
result is, however, allayed by the fact that it was La Salle 
that contended in state court that Courtney and Halpin's 
invitations of tenure meant nothing more than that they 
were guaranteed the "rank of professor" for the duration of 
their active academic life. In other words, La Salle may be 
hoist on its own petard. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to agree with 
Judge Schwarzer that La Salle's policy is not covered by the 
ADEA exemption for tenured faculty members. I therefore 
concur in his opinion and in the judgment of the court. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I doubt that any party to this lawsuit ever believed that 
Courtney and Halpin did not have tenured positions at 
LaSalle. Indeed the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated, 
"Halpin and Courtney were granted tenure according to the 
conditions set forth in the Faculty Bulletin."1 Halpin v. 
LaSalle Univ., 639 A.2d 37, 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
Whatever else tenure may mean, its essence is protection 
from termination. 
 
Yet the Pennsylvania Superior Court chose to define 
tenure here as entitlement to rank only and duration of 
employment from year to year only. Like Judge Becker I 
believe their decision was wrong but like Judge Schwarzer 
I believe we are bound to give it collateral effect. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Faculty Handbook provides: 
 [t]he full-time teacher under contract with tenure may competently 
expect to hold his/her position until he/she is retired for age or 
disability or separated for adequate cause under due process or 
because of financial exigencies of the institution. (AAUP Bul. SM 
1964, p. 114). 
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